Factor Endowment, Electoral System and Economic Sanctions

• In Event: Economic Sanctions and Economic Costs

Abstract

Little attention has paid to how countries choose specific sanctions measures, especially compared with the amount of research on their effectiveness and imposition. In this article, I consider import restrictions as a type of distributive policy that creates winners and losers. Based on Mayer-Hecksher-Ohlin model (1984), I argue that capital-abundant sender country is more likely to impose import restrictions to represent a demand for policies that increasingly favor the labor sector when the sender country has the majoritarian systems that encourage politicians to appeal to the median voter who favors import restrictions. I test this theoretical hypothesis using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data. The empirical results show that capital abundant countries are positively associated with use of import restrictions as a sanction measure when the sender countries have majoritarian rules.

Author

• ChaeEun Cho