Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Rules against individuals or organizations conducting electoral spending in coordination with candidates or parties are critical to protect the efficacy of contribution limits, especially in the world of unlimited spending the Supreme Court created through Buckley v. Valeo, Citizens United, and other cases. Without these rules, large donors could circumvent contribution limits by making large direct expenditures that are directed by candidates so functionally identical to contributions. But, coordination rules also have costs--such as making small donor organizing less efficient and co-governance more difficult. Currently, coordination rules are blunt instruments that do not distinguish between the type of entity doing the spending or the type of activity the spending supports. Through regrounding in the legal and policy objectives of coordination rules, this article articulates a framework that suggests some coordination rules should be strengthened (such as those applied to single candidate Super PACs) whereas others should be relaxed or eliminated entirely (such as those applied to small donor PACs conducting grassroots activity).