The Dark Side of Competition: Organized Crime and Violence in Brazil

• In Event: The Politics of Illicit Economies, Organized Crime, and Extra-Legal Actors Mini-Conference: New Research in Criminal Politics: Criminal Competition and Violence

Abstract

The expansion of São Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Rio de Janeiro’s Comando Vermelho (CV) into all regions and most states in Brazil signifies a major security concern for the country. In fact, it raises a concern for the region and beyond, as the PCC has established presence in neighboring countries, where the drugs are produced, and in receiving countries, particularly in Africa and Europe. A third player, Família do Norte (FDN), poses a challenge to the other organized criminal groups (OCGs), especially in the North region, where the FDN fights to retain control of the lucrative drug trading route through the Amazon. This paper develops a novel methodology for detecting the presence and activity level of OCGs in each Brazilian state using Google searches for the years between 2004 and 2018. We show when the presence of each OCG is detected in each state. We then estimate the level of competition between the different OCGs, and use this information to help explain the variation in homicide rates across time and space. We argue that OCG presence and activity levels by themselves do not explain homicide rates well; in fact, some states with high OCG activity have relatively low homicide rates. However, in combination with a highly competitive scenario, the strong presence of these groups can translate into high levels of violence. We conclude with warnings about what the expansion of these powerful groups may mean for the state and its institutions.

Author

• Stephanie Gimenez Stahlberg, Johns Hopkins University