State Cohesion, Capacity, or Stability? Ending Violent Criminal Competition

• In Event: The Politics of Illicit Economies, Organized Crime, and Extra-Legal Actors Mini-Conference: New Research in Criminal Politics: Criminal Competition and Violence

Abstract

A growing body of literature has explained the onset of homicidal violence in Mexico and elsewhere on competition for territorial control between criminal groups, possibly triggered by state crackdown policies. I shift the focus from onset to termination. Criminal conflict can decline in two ways: (1) rivals fight until a single victor wins monopoly control; (2) rivals continue to share territory but behave less violently. Path 1 (less criminal group competition) is more likely when the security apparatus becomes more cohesive/coordinated, and path 2 (less violent behavior between criminal groups) is more likely when a security apparatus becomes more capable. Recoveries are only durable, however, when the structure, capacity, and stance of the security apparatus is perceived as stable. I provide evidence on these pathways using mixed methods and new data sets of local-level criminal group presence and security apparatus composition with a focus on northern Mexican cities, 2006–2018.

Author

• Patrick Joseph Signoret, Princeton University