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The COVID-19 pandemic requires fast and decisive regulation to save lives and economies. However, parliamentary decision-making is time consuming based on plenary debates and legislative scrutiny, which makes government takeover likely. We argue that existing relations between parliament and government influence the ways in which parliaments meet this challenge. The pandemic highlights strengths and weaknesses of existing parliamentary institutions potentially paving the way for reforms. We evaluate this argument based on a comparative study of the parliamentary activity in Italy and Denmark during the first wave of COVID-19 and find that both parliaments came under pressure with regard to law making and control, but the sources of government dominance vary, and only the Danish parliament installed new mechanisms for regaining lost powers. It is too early to make conclusions regarding long-term parliamentary consequences of COVID-19, but our study suggests that only strong, unified parliaments will be able to recover and potentially translate challenges into new opportunities.