Buying Repressive Capacity

• In Event: Regime Durability in the Face of Coups

Abstract

To what extent are militaries incentivized to be part of the states’ repressive apparatuses? In this article, we examine the role of material interests, mainly in the form of military involvement in the economy, in explaining state repression. Military involvement in the economy in the form of owning/managing economic enterprises (banks, hotels, manufacturing factories, etc.) provides the Armed Forces material incentives to first, be used as repressive agents by their political leaders, and second, to commit acts of repression beyond the demand of political leaders. We argue that by allowing the military to benefit from economic activities, leaders create incentives for the military to repress on behalf of the government. However, as the military becomes more involved in the economy, they are less likely to be used as repressive agents as they are no longer dependent on the government to preserve their economic interests. On the other hand, the militaries that are dependent on the government to maintain their economic interests are more likely to commit repression on behalf of political leaders. Finally, no matter the extent of military involvement in the economy, militaries with stakes in the economy are more likely to commit repression compared to ones with no such interests.

Authors

• Roya Izadi, University of Rhode Island

• Skip Mark, University of Rhode Island