Fighting Bias with Bias: Patronage and Local Bureaucrats in Kenya

• In Event: Patronage and the Politics of the Public Sector

Abstract

The existing literature on bureaucracy regards low-level, menial positions as "jobs for the boys," i.e. positions with which politicians can reward their supporters. However, that received wisdom assumes a politician's desire for patronage is always implemented as intended. We instead highlight the importance of bureaucratic managers, the public officials who actually hire and fire those in menial positions. In particular, we argue that, if managers’ incentives are not aligned with politicians, managers can neuter politicians ability to pursue patronage. We collect data on the universe of local bureaucrats in Kenya from 2004-2012 to illustrate these dynamics. First, consistent with existing literature on patronage, we demonstrate a bias in hiring and promotions for bureaucrats co-ethnic with the local council majority. Second, even while controlling for the bias of the political majority, we also demonstrate an additional bias in hiring and promotions for bureaucrats co-ethnic with managers. Third, we show that these two effects interact. When the local majority and the bureaucratic manager are not co-ethnic and thus do not share incentives, we show that the managers stymie and prevent patronage that would otherwise occur. We therefore contribute to the literature on bureaucracy by shifting the locus of patronage politics away from local politicians and towards bureaucratic managers.

Authors

• Stuart Russell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Mai Omer Hassan, MIT

• Horacio Larreguy, ITAM