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Nuclear Disarmament Negotiation in Unequal Nuclear Force Situation

Fri, September 16, 2:00 to 3:30pm, TBA


1.Research Objective
The purpose of this study is to establish a strategy of achieving nuclear disarmament in an unequal nuclear force situation. The specific contents are as follows.
(1)To achieve nuclear disarmament to reduce the possibility of nuclear war.
(2)To achieve peaceful nuclear disarmament, it is necessary to make the weaker side move first and voluntarily accept disarmament.
(3)To prevent military sanctions from occurring on the stronger side after disarmament.
(4)Trust building is essential for nuclear disarmament that satisfies (1)-(3), and it is necessary to consider how to achieve it.
The objective of nuclear disarmament and arms control is to prevent nuclear war. However, not all nuclear disarmament policies are unconditionally compatible with the objective, and nuclear disarmament without the right conditions can lead to results that are contrary to the objective. Therefore, nuclear disarmament, which will surely contribute to the prevention of nuclear war, is necessary.
However, nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament have stagnated in 2010s. If new nuclear powers and potential nuclear powers give up their nuclear weapons, it breaks the stagnation. This study explores the means to achieve this goal, mainly using game theory.

This study shows the conditions for peaceful agreement in nuclear disarmament negotiation. In this game, the stronger side has two strategies (peace treaty and military sanction) and the weaker side has two strategies (nuclear armament and nuclear disarmament). On the weak side, there are two attributes: soft security seeker and hard security seeker. The preference orders of them are as follows.
Hard security seeker : u(Arm,Pea)>u(Arm,San)>u(Dis,Pea)>u(Dis,San)
Soft security seeker: u(Arm,Pea)>u(Dis,Pea)>u(Arm,San)>u(Dis,San)
Stronger side: u(Dis,Pea)≥u(Dis,San)>u(Arm,San)>u(Arm,Pea)
What this model shows is that the attribute of the weak side is the soft security seeker, that the weak side moves first and chooses disarmament, and that there is a guarantee that the strong side will not impose military sanctions after the weaker side’s disarmament. If the stronger side moves first and chooses peace treaty, peaceful nuclear disarmament is not an equilibrium point, even if it is the soft security seeker, because nuclear disarmament is not the optimal strategy for the weaker side. Therefore, it is necessary to make the weaker side choose nuclear disarmament preemptively. This is the most characteristic condition in denuclearization negotiation.
The general negotiation theory shows that a stronger side should move first and assure no deception to a weaker side for peaceful agreement. The weaker side does not choose disarmament without assurance of no deception because the stronger side easily defeats the weaker side after it disarms. To avoid the deception of the stronger side, the stronger side needs to take initiative. The model case is a peace negotiation of civil war involving the disarmament of rebel groups.
However, in the nuclear disarmament issue, the weaker side sufficiently protects itself as long as it has nuclear deterrence and keeping nuclear weapons after getting peace treaty is the optimal strategy. Therefore, to achieve denuclearization, the weaker side has to show clearly the will of disarming before the stronger side’s moving.
The important issue is the credibility that the stronger side will not deceive after disarmament. If the trust level of the weaker side is a sufficiently large value, it can move first and choose disarmament. Therefore, it is necessary to find variables which increase the trust level. However, in this game, which can be described as a prisoner's dilemma situation, it is fundamentally difficult to achieve mutual trust between the stronger and weaker sides alone, and the movement of third parties play important roles as security assurances.
To analyze security assurances and trust building in nuclear disarmament negotiations, I have focused on IAEA inspection and pressure of international public opinion. Although these have not been regarded as relevant factors in nuclear issues, IAEA inspection not only prevents the weaker side’s deception but also ensures there is no deception from the stronger side. The pressure of international public opinion, which expects nuclear disarmament and peaceful resolution, also serves to restrain acts of war from the stronger side.
The IAEA inspection assures the stronger side that the weaker side does not hide nuclear capabilities. More importantly, it makes the weaker side’s first move feasible. IAEA inspection is an essential device to clarify whether a target state performs illegal/covert actions. International public opinion is one more assurance device for achieving nuclear disarmament. It has enough effect and moves international politics when conditions are right.