The Mass Politics of the Backlash against Globalization

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The key pillars of globalization, open trade, economic interdependence, international cooperation, and multilateral institutions are currently under severe pressure. In many important economies around the world, nationalism, polarization and populist rhetoric and politics increasingly threaten the maintenance of an open international economy. In the context of globalization, the nation state is traditionally thought to play a crucial role in mitigating the economic costs of globalization and supporting the economically vulnerable. However, against the backdrop of the decline of the left, increasing polarization, economic pressures and international changing power relations, the salvaging role of the nation appears increasingly insignificant. This panel thus explores these different domestic and international explanations for the rise of anti-globalization attitudes and associated political behavior.

Balcazar and Park directly address the question of why the economically vulnerable vote for right-wing, rather than left-wing parties. Using game theory, they argue that the well-known cognitive bias of individuals toward overweighting losses - loss aversion - unpacks this puzzle. They show that individuals close to, but above the social-safety-net's reference point are more likely to be loss-averse. This occurs because the marginal benefit from government transfers these individuals obtain if they fall below the reference point in the future is smaller than the benefit they receive from paying lower taxes in the present. Therefore the relative benefit of redistributive taxation falls for the economically vulnerable due to loss aversion, boosting the appeal of right-wing parties. They also show that this cognitive bias increases the appeal of other policies that reduce international integration because the marginal benefit of limiting international competition in the present becomes comparatively large, providing also one explanation for the rise of attitudes against globalization. Finally, they show that politicians can manipulate individuals perceptions of future losses, to boost the attractiveness of the aforementioned policies via loss aversion.

Why are economically vulnerable individuals more likely to oppose free trade? Obermeier explores whether common frames employed in political rhetoric surrounding free trade agreements play a role in the relationship between economic vulnerability and opposition to free trade. Using an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey of Canadians, this paper finds that the framing of free trade agreement shapes individuals’ attitudes toward free trade. In particular, while economically secure individuals express greater support for free trade when agreements are framed as liberalizing markets, framing free trade agreements as establishing common standards among countries boosts support for free trade among economically vulnerable individuals.

Political polarization and anti-globalization attitudes have both increased in recent times. Katitas and Orhan examine the impact of affective polarisation on globalization attitudes. In a large-scale survey experiment funded by NSF in Turkey, they seek answers to the following questions: Does antagonism toward out-partisans increase trade opposition when respondents receive cues that the out-party leader supports trade? Is priming national identity instead of partisan identity reduce the effect of partisan animus on trade opinion? Does partisan animus or elite polarization drive our results? Exploring these questions with a combination of vignette and conjoint experiments provide us new insights on how elite cues and partisan reasoning determine the backlash against globalization.

Polarization has also be accompanied by the increased vilification of trade with China, especially in the U.S. Nguyen, Sattler and Schweinberger therefore explore the importance of changing international power relations. With original survey experiments in the U.S. and China, they show that citizens from the declining power are increasingly concerned about unequal gains from international economic cooperation. Interestingly, these effects are not heterogeneous and prevail across different political ideologies and other social-demographic attributes. Whilst current U.S. politics is generally characterized by political polarization, a political consensus predominates for limiting trade cooperation with China.

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Individual Presentations

• Explaining the Anti-globalization Backlash Using Prospect Theory - Carlos Felipe Balcazar, New York University; In Young Park, Princeton University

• Trading Frames: Economic Uncertainty and Support for Free Trade - Nina Obermeier, University of Pennsylvania

• Affective Polarization and Trade Attitudes: Evidence from Turkey - Aycan Katitas, Carnegie Mellon University; Yunus E Orhan, North Dakota State University

• Power Transitions and International Economic Cooperation - Quynh Nguyen, Australian National University; Thomas Sattler, University of Geneva; Tanja Schweinberger, University of Geneva

Chair

• Alexandra Guisinger Temple University

Discussants

• Amy Pond Technical University of Munich

• Ryan Brutger University of California, Berkeley