Intuitive Approaches to Logics of Research, Case Selection and Causality

• In Event: Causality, Processes, and Mechanisms

Abstract

For positivist scholars, using intuition is often seen as something pejorative, best avoided, or approved upon by methodological developments (e.g., the introduction of Bayesian approaches to process tracing). Meanwhile, for interpretive scholars, the role of “hunches” is often lauded as a necessary guiding mechanism. This paper explores the role of intuition and argues for acknowledging, recognizing, and legitimizing its role across methodological and epistemic divides. In particular, the paper shows how intuition plays an important role in 1) logics of research (inductive, deductive, or abductive), 2) case selection, and 3) exploring causal mechanisms. On the one hand, the paper discusses how deductive logics are positioned in a hierarchy of superiority that incentivizes and prioritizes deductive work. On the other hand, such incentives are untransparent and shoehorn work that might not really be deductive into such a framework. Meanwhile, scholars are prevented from using intuition to shift approach and adopt a more abductive/iterative approach when deductive work fails or falls short analytically. In other words, this paper argues for an empowered methodological approach to using intuition to make important research decisions, rather than be ashamed of or shy away from its role. Overall, the paper addresses how recognizing and legitimizing the role of intuition aligns with endeavors for encouraging more transparency and “reflexive openness” in political science.

Author

• Eleanor Knott, London School of Economics