Electoral Competition, Resource Booms, and Public Goods Provision in Peru

• In Event: Popular Mobilization and State Violence in Latin America

Abstract

Research has shown that countries with weak institutions are more prone to protest as governments' abilities to deliver or meet on citizens' expectations fail to match that of the capacity for protest mobilization. The existing literature has found that the effect of electoral competition is associated with highly levels of protest as a means for citizens to voice their discontent and policy demands. Higher level of electoral competition is also the primary mechanism driving governments' political responsiveness by spending more budget on public goods provisions. Additionally, the presence of natural resource rents is linked to higher levels of protest. Yet the empirical evidence remains missing regarding how the effects of electoral incentives on protest are conditional to not only the size of the mining revenues, but also government's political responsiveness by increasing budget execution. Using original protest and mayoral election data in Peru at the subnational level from 2008-2014, this paper uses variation in natural resource rents (Canon) and government's budget execution among Peruvian municipalities to analyze the impact of electoral incentives on political protest. We argue that the effect of the electoral incentives on protest are conditional on the incumbent's resources and its capacity to use them.

Authors

• Amy Chiang, University of California, San Francisco

• Jose Incio, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru