Coalition Building in Multilateral Climate Bargaining

• In Event: Political Economy of Climate Change

Abstract

A growing trend in multilateral bargaining is the rise of coalitions, groups of states that join together to bargain as a single unit. The growing prominence of negotiating blocs has been noted in a number of contexts, most prominently the multilateral regimes for international trade and climate change. Across contexts negotiating blocs vary in the size and heterogeneity of their membership. Why do some states form broad coalitions with obvious veto power while others instead form narrow, issue-specific coalitions ostensibly with little hope of influencing negotiations? I analyze a game theoretic model of coalition formation in the presence of multilateral bargaining. I show that coalition formation depends on the distribution of proposal power across states. States with a low probability of being selected as proposer optimally band together with similar states to form small coalitions. These coalitions can be easily bought and so are likely to be included in any minimal winning coalition. In contrast states with greater proposal power optimally form larger, blocking coalitions. These states are unlikely to be included in any winning coalition unless one of their own is selected to propose. Forming a larger coalition then guarantees that bargaining will continue until this occurs and as a result all coalition members receive a share of the surplus to cooperation. I illustrate the plausibility of the model's predictions using automated content analysis of UNFCCC bargaining texts.

Author

• Amanda Kennard, Stanford University