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Preferential voting has value for democracy not only in how such systems reach decisions, but also in the discourses they sustain prior to and following moments of decision-making. Supporters tout evidence that preferential voting moderates campaign rhetoric by incentivizing candidates to compete for second or third-rank votes across traditional social or partisan divides. Yet, normative theory offers conflicting guidance about the virtues of these incentives. While proponents argue preferential voting encourages cross-group deliberation, critics worry it rewards milquetoast campaigns that submerge genuine conflict and favor advantaged groups. I argue that preferential voting’s tendency to produce more positive and civil campaigns may undermine democracy’s legitimacy and epistemic quality so far as that tendency biases rhetoric and governance toward an unequal status quo. Rather, if preferential voting has discursive value, it lies in its potential to reduce arbitrary inequalities of voice between groups without minimizing conflict among them. I investigate how preferential voting mechanisms can create incentives for representatives to incorporate constituencies’ diverse epistemic contributions into collective decisions. My account suggests promising hypotheses for further empirical research.