Who Chooses Civil Service in China: Individual Traits and (Mis)Beliefs

• In Event: Political Recruitment and State Capacity in China

Abstract

Who wants to work for the government in China today? This question has profound implications for the state's governing capacity, policy preference, and level of corruption. We argue that an individual's beliefs about the civil service — the corruption level, the financial reward, level of competition for entry, and chance of promotion — interact with her traits (including ability, honesty, risk preference, and altruism) to jointly determine her propensity to self-select into civil service. Importantly, we demonstrate that individuals form beliefs inconsistent with reality, resulting in heterogeneous preferences for government jobs among those with similar traits.

Empirically, we design and implement a survey experiment among 1,000 college graduates in China between the age of 22 and 30, all eligible to join the civil service via the Civil Service Examination (CSE). Using a series of lab games, we first compare the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of respondents interested in joining the civil service to the characteristics of those who are not. Next, using randomized vignette treatments, we causally explore how individual (mis)beliefs about the civil service determines their willingness to join. Lastly, we explore how such effects vary for respondents of different traits.

The findings of this study shed light on self-selection into public service in China today, with general implications to the government's talent recruitment. It highlights how various features of the civil service may attract or repel applicants of varying traits based on their beliefs about the civil service.

Authors

• Hanzhang Liu, Pitzer College

• Bo Feng, Boston University

• Qiwei He, Cornell University