Redistribution in Ranked Systems: Experimental Evidence from India

• In Event: The Formation of Redistributive Preferences in India

Abstract

Ranked systems – societies in which individuals inherit a social rank at birth – exist as a legacy of historic social stratification such as slavery, apartheid, colonialism, or the caste system. How and why might such ranked systems prevent the emergence of a pro-redistribution majority? Part of the answer to the question relates to economic inequalities between the median voters in each social group. Previous scholarship on group-based inequalities – class or ethnic – suggests that income or wealth conditions groups’ levels of support for redistributive policies (Meltzer and Richard 1981, Baldwin and Huber 2010).

In this project, we develop an additional explanation and provide evidence for it. Beyond economic inequalities, we argue that ranked structures further prevent the emergence of a pro-redistribution majority because citizens from high-rank groups - including the poor among these groups - reject policies and investments that threaten their group’s relative social status in the hierarchy. We argue that members of high rank groups are likely to care about the maintenance of their (comparatively high) social status in the system, especially through the enforcement of segregation and spatial/social distancing from members of lower groups. This frequently leads not just the wealthy but also poor members of high rank groups to turn away from some of the policies traditionally favored by the poor. Namely, they tend to support those social policies that maintain, directly or indirectly, a distinction between the poor that belong to low rank groups and themselves. High ranked groups will resist policies that lead to greater physical integration across groups, and/or policies that reduce segregation. Additionally, we argue that opposition to policies perceived to threaten their status should be especially strong when members of high-rank groups are primed with information about the growing integration of lower ranked groups.

To test these arguments, we field a survey (N=3650) including a survey-experiment across the Northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. We use this instrument to measure attitudes towards redistribution and preferences in terms of redistributive policies across both class and caste lines. Our experiment primes treatment group respondents with a clear picture of the trend when it comes to the decreased degree of domination of Upper Castes in the bureaucracy, before gauging their support for a variety of public policies. Building on the aforementioned argument, we expect our treatment prompt will, compared to our “control prompt” (a similar trend for a topic presumably unrelated to caste), 1. prime respondents to the idea that Upper-Castes have lost their dominant position in the state over time and 2. as a result, further reduce their willingness to support public investment and policies.

Using these data, we test 1. whether poor members of high rank groups differ from other poors when it comes to public good provision and redistribution, and 2. Whether poor members of high rank groups exposed to information highlighting higher groups’ loss of status and/or the further integration of lower ranked groups are less supportive of redistribution policies than High rank group members NOT exposed to this information.

Author

• Pavithra Suryanarayan, Johns Hopkins University