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The objective is to explore the connection between the proportional electoral system (PR) and party organisations as key institutional determinants for electoral volatility at the party-level from cross-party, national, and temporal perspectives (Gherghina, 2013). We developed an integrated model to address two questions: 1) Do candidate-centred electoral systems impact the development of stable electoral support? 2) If the electoral system has any impact, does it occur directly or mediated by party organisations? A considerable body of literature on electoral systems emphasises that candidate-centred electoral systems – which encourage candidates to cultivate personal instead of party reputations – promote intraparty competition and unrooted party organisations (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Ames, 2001). Nonetheless, there is little comparative empirical analysis on how party organisations have strategically answered to changes in electoral rules toward institutional personalisation (Mainwaring, 1999). Using V-Party (2020) and V-Dem (2020) databases, we selected and analysed 600 parties in 48 countries covering third-wave democracies, post-communist countries, and the most extensive proportional democracies in Europe (Western and Eastern Europe) and Americas between 1989 and 2019 -- large-N cross-national comparative analysis (Janda, 1980). Based on panel models, we found that the candidate-centred electoral system is negatively related to developing strong ties between parties and the electorate, but only in party organisations with low party strength, intraparty cohesion, financial linkages with non-party groups. When the decision-making process concentrates power in the hands of powerful party elites, they can solve coordination problems and mitigate intraparty conflicts and personalisation consequences.