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Despite overwhelming desires for Ukrainian sovereignty in 1991, two decades of independence shifted many loyalties in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine back to Moscow. In 1991, the Ukrainian referendum to secede from the Soviet Union was supported by all ethnic groups and regions in Ukraine, including 54% of the population in Crimea and well over 80% in all eastern oblasts. Twenty-five years later many in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have organized in an effort to join the Russian Federation. While the Russian military is an essential factor in facilitating some of these changes, it was also a potential partner in 1991 and does not sufficiently explain why some people have switched state loyalties and supported the insurgency. To help answer why many in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine sustain support for Russian rule and militancy and those in other parts of Ukraine do not, I conduct a detailed comparative analysis of national identity across three Ukrainian regions. I tentatively argue that state bureaucracy in Western Ukraine stifled Russian influence in the region but industrial patrimonialism stymied organized opposition to irredentism and Russian insurgencies in both Crimea and Eastern Ukrainian.