“When You Come at the King…”: When Opposition Coalitions Fail under Autocracy

• In Event: Poster Session: Comparative Politics I

Abstract

For opposition parties challenging authoritarian incumbents, the benefits of pre-electoral coalitions can be significant. Multiple studies have demonstrated that, under certain conditions, coalitions can increase the opposition’s likelihood of victory and improve prospects for short-term democratization. But what about cases in which these benefits fail to materialize in the immediate aftermath? I argue that, in competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition coalitions that produce substantial gains but fall short of outright victory can actually undermine prospects for democratization in the long run. Such an outcome can provide an informational signal to the incumbent about the opposition’s increasing relative capacity, while leaving the opposition vulnerable to subsequent repression and sabotage. To test my theory, I look cross-nationally at the status of democracy in the decade following autocratic elections between 1990 and 2010. I find that, while opposition coalitions did increase the likelihood of short-run democratization in competitive authoritarian contexts, where election-year democratic transitions did not occur, opposition coalitions were associated with a lower likelihood of democracy’s emergence in the subsequent decade. To examine theoretical mechanisms behind this relationship, I present an in-depth case study of the performance of Cambodia’s opposition between 2012 and 2018, where a major opposition party merger precipitated an electoral near miss and was followed by the party’s dissolution and significant authoritarian retrenchment. The lessons of my analysis confirm the adage that, “when you come at the king, you best not miss.” This research speaks to ongoing debates about opposition strategy and performance under autocracy, as well as broader theories of democratization by elections.

Author

• Oren Samet, University of California, Berkeley