Targeting Patronage and Mobilizing Votes: Evidence from Tammany Hall, 1890-1915

• In Event: The Historical Political Economy of Inequality and Clientelism

Abstract

Who gets patronage jobs in the public sector? Do politicians target patronage employment to specific individuals to mobilize votes? I study these questions in the context of the archetypical patronage organization in US history: New York City’s Tammany Hall political machine. I am digitizing and linking newly collected archival records on the organization’s personnel, the universe of city employees, and detailed electoral data. Complete lists of applicants, appointments, and the results of civil service exams allow me to identify who receives patronage jobs, and how the characteristics of patronage appointees differ from applicants who would have been selected for the job if civil service rules had been followed. In particular, I document whether Tammany Hall selects poorer and less qualified applicants. Are these applicants selected because they are more likely to reciprocate by mobilizing votes for Tammany politicians in their neighborhood? The main challenge for identification is potential confounding from the strategic selection of patronage appointments. To alleviate this concern, I isolate exogenous variation in the likelihood of getting a patronage job induced by turnover in Tammany Hall leaders.

Author

• Lukas Leucht, UC Berkeley