How Do Dictators Repress? The Case of Taiwan’s Pre-democratic Era

• In Event: Gender and Transitional Justice and Democratization in Taiwan

Abstract

How do dictators maintain regime stability? Is repression the most effective mean to keep them in power? This paper explores the changing role of authoritarian repression and how repression encompasses the strengthened opposition force in Taiwan's young democracy. This study collects time-series data for 39 years(1949-1988) to examine the development of opposition force and the significant determinant of the alternation of repressive mode. By proposing a repression-economic model, we argue that the economic structure/institution will lead to changes in the pattern of repression; as the economic growth, dictators will tend to use selective repression and co-optation rather than indiscriminate repression. Our theory implies that with the increase of opposition forces, the dictators will face the dilemma; this means the dictator needs to balance the demand side of opposition forces and regime stability. Moreover, the conventional wisdom of modernization theory explains the relationship between economic growth and the possibility of democratization. It holds that as the economy grows, the social movements will also increase. This study also aims to fill the gap between the literature on repression and modernization theory. Using the design of the empirical analysis, the finding of our work illuminates how the strategies of maintaining regime stability could be changed when the transformation of economic structure and how the dictator can solve its dilemma.

Authors

• Yi-Jhan Shaka Li, Tunghai University

• Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, Sam Houston State University