Rethinking the Relationship between Domestic Instability and War

• In Event: Domestic Politics and War

Abstract

Does political instability at home increase the likelihood that states will engage in war? Most international relations scholarship on this subject focuses on how instability can lead to war via the diversionary theory. We argue that the fixation on the diversionary theory is misplaced. The statistical work on diversionary war is plagued by mixed findings and conceptual problems. In the qualitative work, we show that it is difficult to find a single compelling case. This is not to say the diversionary mechanism does not exist, and it can lead to war. In fact, we elaborate a case of diversionary war that is ignored in the literature. But that case exhibits why diversionary wars almost never happen. The risks and the costs of war and the dubiousness of war resolving dissatisfaction with the regime mean it will rarely be a tool leaders rely on for purely diversionary purposes. We argue scholars need to consider more broadly how instability can lead to war, but also how it can lead to peace. There needs to be a greater focus on the array of mechanisms, which we lay out in this paper. The starting point in understanding the mechanisms is assessing whether leaders are trying to preserve the status quo or not and then whether war or peace serves their aims, and under what conditions. Those revolutionaries that seek to overthrow their own institutions are a distinct minority, but they are a subclass disproportionately involved in international conflict and relatively ignored. For both types of leaders, war is often not the answer. We illustrate how leaders have different aims and sometimes prefer war or peace to achieve those aims by examining one country’s remarkable period of domestic instability – French foreign policy pre, during, and post-Revolution – and how that related to war and peace.

Authors

• Chad Nelson, Brigham Young University

• Frank Andrew Horne, Department of State