The Effect of Partisan Identity Activation on Endorsement of Populism

• In Event: Graduate Student Research Lightning Round: Identity, Public Opinion

Abstract

Populism, the political rhetoric of emphasizing conflicts between “the people” and elites, had experienced a revival in recent years (Mudde, 2004). In the populist ideation, common people are good and virtuous, while the elites are corrupt and evil (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). While much has been investigated on leaders’ use of populism, less is known about audiences’ reaction to it, the prevalence of populist sentiments across populations, and the causes and psychological processes (including mediators) which leads to its endorsement. Studies did show, however, that populist attitudes could be induced by exposure to populist messages that use language evoking anger and attributing blame to the elites (Busby et al., 2020, Rico et al., 2017). Specifically, populist messages high in blame attribution were found to increase blame perceptions and populist attitudes, an effect moderated by attachment to a national or supra-national identity (Hameleers et al., 2016).
Social identity refers to the aspects of people’s self-image that derive from social categories to which they belong; it tends to emerge when individuals are cued to defend their positive self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When one's social identity is threatened, for example, individuals may secure their self-concept by prioritizing ingroups and discriminating against outgroups, which could be exhibited as perceptions, emotions, or behaviors. Mason (2018) argued that historical and political trends, which increasingly cued one’s partisan identity, could make individuals more susceptible to extremist messages, which we argue includes populism.
The main goal of our study is to test this argument in a controlled environment, by manipulating priming of partisanship before exposing participants to populist messages. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that partisanship, when primed, will increase blaming of elites. We will not specify who the elites are, and hypothesize that the effect will be moderated by one’s partisanship—Republicans will be more likely to blame the government and the media, and Democrats will be more likely to blame big corporations. To validate that the effects are the result of populism and not political discourse in general, we will conduct an experimental design (ResearchCloud, N = 500), where participants will be exposed to one of five conditions: a 2 (populist vs. non populist political message) X 2 (primed partisanship vs. not-primed) + 1 (no exposure control). We hypothesize that:
H1: All political messages will increase political identity activation compared to no-exposure control.
RQ1: Will the two populist messages lead to stronger activation than non-populist political messages?
H2: Within the populist conditions, participants will have higher identity activation if also being primed to think about their social identity before exposure.
H3: Social identity activation will increase blame attribution towards elites.
Acknowledging the potential of populism to appear in both right and left-leaning ideologies, we argue that in the current polarized political environment, strong partisans exposed to populist messages will follow party cues, such that Republicans will exhibit negative reactions to the government, and Democrats towards large corporations (Pew Research Center, 2021). We therefore hypothesize:
H4: The effect of activation on the target of blame will be moderated by one’s political identity (Republicans blame media and government; Democrats blame big corporations)
H5: Blame will increase anti-elitism (a component of populist attitudes)

References

Busby, E. C., Gubler, J. R., & Hawkins, K.A.(2019). Framing and blame attribution in populist rhetoric. Journal of Politics, 81(2), 616–630. https://doi.org/10.1086/701832
Pew Research Center. (2021, Nov 9). Beyond red vs blue: The political typology. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/11/09/beyond-red-vs-blue-the-political-typology-2/
Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). “They did it”: The effects of emotionalized blame attribution in populist communication. Communication Research, 44(6), 870–900. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650216644026
Mason, L. (2018). Unicivil agreement: How politics became our identity. The University of Chicago Press.
Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist, Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541-63.
Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press
Rico, G., Guinjoan, M., & Anduiza, E. (2017). The emotional underpinnings of populism: How anger and fear affect populist attitudes. Swiss Pol. Science Review, 23(4), 444–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33-47). Brooks/Cole.

Authors

• Raphaela Velho, University at Buffalo

• Yotam Ophir, University at Buffalo