Declining Violence and Electoral Competition in the Philippines

• In Event: Political Mobilization through Violence and Non-violence

Abstract

Electoral violence is often a hallmark of fledgling, unconsolidated democracy. Yet electoral violence declined in the Philippines over a period of democratic backsliding. Assassinations and attacks on rivals’ supporters have become increasingly uncommon. What accounts for this decline? This paper presents new data on political violence in the Philippines. I argue that a weak state like the Philippines governs by regulating—but not monopolizing—the use of violence in society through a mix of strategies ranging from accommodation to domination. I show that the central government has a capacity for cracking down on recalcitrant “strongmen” across the country while accommodating allies. Moreover, local politicians coordinate the fielding of candidates in electoral contests in order to win seats unopposed—often obviating the need for coercion even in places with a history of bloody polls. My sources include case investigation files of the country’s Commission on Human Rights and unpublished submissions to the International Criminal Court (ICC)—original and hitherto unused sources—as well as government documents, independent NGO reports, and news clippings. Overall, violence has declined over time as parochial dynasties, allied with national elites, consolidate their power outside the capital and employ new practices to constrain electoral competition.

Author

• Sol Iglesias, University of the Philippines