Basing and Busting: The Impacts of Military Alliances on Sanctions-Busting Trade

• In Event: Sanctions and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, the US has maintained a sizable military peacetime presence across the globe. The deployment of US troops and the maintenance of US bases abroad is a manifestation of both the US’s and its partners’ commitment to their security alliance. Does security cooperation spill over into other areas of cooperation, such as complying with US sanctions regimes? Our research explores sanctions-busting from 1962-2020 to understand whether the magnitude of a US military presence within a host nation (in terms of the size of the deployment) impacts the propensity that they will engage in sanctions-busting when the US is the primary sender of economic sanctions. Using the Global Sanctions Database and US global military deployments (1950–2020) data, we test the probability of sanctions-busting by US host nations. We argue that the presence and size of bases and/or troops should reduce the probability of trade-based sanctions busting as higher levels are likely indicative of strong alliance ties and congruence of foreign policy interests. However, host nations with a large number of bases should be the least likely to bust US sanctions, as permanent bases are less tractable and more symbolic of a deep military alliance than merely permitting the US to station troops within the country. Our paper underscores how deep economic and military ties between the US and potential trade-based sanctions-busting states should improve the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

Authors

• Charmaine N. Willis, Old Dominion University

• Keith A Preble, East Carolina University