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Under what conditions can repression, generally assumed to induce social obedience through violence, consolidate authoritarian power in a non-violent way? I propose a novel theory of the effects of repression, accounting for regional heterogeneity of state capacity in authoritarian countries. I maintain that authoritarian leaders need to compete with regional governance structures of opposition to establish authority and therefore face dogged resistance to their co-optation policies. Repression in such “restive” regions has downstream effects that complement autocrats' co-optation policies by increasing state capacity and rendering local communities legible. To test my theoretical predictions, I exploit the attempted coup in July 2016 in Turkey, a unique event that led to the replacement of pro-Kurdish mayors with government trustees in Turkey’s restive regions. Adopting regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference designs, I demonstrate evidence supporting my theory. This paper provides an alternative view as to when repression can generate favorable outcomes for authoritarian survival.