How Do Corruption Perceptions Shape Preferences for Income Redistribution?

• In Event: Institutions, Inequality, and Policy Action and Inaction

Abstract

Countries with high market inequality tend to redistribute income less than those that are more equal. Comparative evidence suggests that higher levels of government corruption in less equal countries provide a partial explanation (Sanchez and Goda 2018). But this is inconsistent with economic theories that deduce that corruption should increase demand for redistribution in order to offset its effects (Alesina and Angelitos 2005), as well as with recent empirical findings from Latin America that tend to confirm this (Hauk, Oviedo and Ramos 2022). These contradictory findings may be partly explained by different levels of estimation. Most comparative studies of corruption rely on expert judgements at the country-level. Studies employing individual-level perceptions of corruption are relatively rare. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module 5) we employ a country-level estimate of the effectiveness of corruption control with individual-level measurements of corruption perceptions, and mediated by left-right ideological positions, use a multi-level model to test their effects on preferences for income redistribution.

Authors

• Jack Vowles, Victoria University of Wellington

• Shaun Bowler, University of California, Riverside