Imperfect Rights and the Moral Economy of Esteem

• In Event: Rights of Others and Responsibilities toward Others in Modern Political Thought

Abstract

This will be a chapter from my ongoing book project on The Science of Right. Grotius and Pufendorf famously distinguish between 'perfect' and 'imperfect' rights. Whereas the former are rights that are legally actionable (paradigmatically, the creditor's right to sue for repayment of an outstanding debt),the latter are never legally actionable, yet still activate correlative duties which, if not performed, represent a moral wrong or harm to the right holder. The concept was originally introduced on the model of legal remedies or actions in the Roman law of actions. But Grotius and Pufendorf both used imperfect rights as a measure of one's worth (or, in Pufendorf's words, 'price' - pretium) in the eyes of others. To assert an imperfect right, then, is to demand recognition - 'due respect' - and an appropriate sign of honor from others, whether from one's own peers as well as from those in superior positions of political authority. What emerges, then, is a kind of economy, in which political society also functions as a marketplace. What is the remedy when one is 'cheated' of the respect or honor that is rightfully (though 'imperfectly') due? The juridical insights of Grotius and Pufendorf on imperfect rights shed light on the dependence on the approval of others that would become a central concern for Rousseau.

Author

• Daniel Lee