Cooperative Institutions and Violent Conflict: On the Role of Social Norms

• In Event: Rebels and Civilians

Abstract

Local, cooperative institutions facilitate the formation and consolidation of pro-social norms (Ostrom 2000). How do pro-social norms function when formal institutions have broken down, during or immediately after violent conflict? What is the effect of pro-social norms on conflict? To answer these questions, we develop a formal model to explore the avenues by which pre-existing pro-social norms may affect the intensity and duration of violent conflict. The model suggests that strong, local, pro-social norms are a mixed blessing, making communities better organized to resist rebels’ capacity to tax residents and recruit fighters but also potentially rising the surplus that rebels might collect if they succeed. We explore the mechanisms proposed by the model and their implications through three case studies: Somalia, Senegal, and Nepal. In particular, we exploit variations in the nature and extent of existing cooperative institutions facilitating pro-social norms.

Authors

• Jessica Steinberg, Indiana University- International Studies

• Gustavo Torrens, Indiana University