Deals to Stop Alliances

• In Event: Bargaining and Disputes

Abstract

How do states react to the anticipation of a new alliance forming against them? In contrast to previous work that has focused on the use of war to stop impending alliances, we study how targeted states may strike quid-pro-quo ``deals'' with potential allies. In these deals, targeted states offer concessions to states planning to ally against them. In exchange, the potential allies forego implementation of a new alliance. Consequently, the threat of a new alliance is eliminated. To illustrate this logic and trace its consequences, we analyze a dynamic formal model of alliance formation, negotiations, and conflict. We illustrate the strategic dynamics embodied in the model by tracing the logic in documentation from the historical record, tying our results to the Cuban missile crisis, the Baghdad pact, and U.S. commitments in east Asia in the 1950s.

Authors

• Brett V. Benson, Vanderbilt University

• Bradley C Smith, Vanderbilt University