Ideological Composition of Public Administrators: 90,000 Centers of Gravity

• In Event: The State Executive Branch In and Out of Crisis

Abstract

This paper argues that public administrators are likely to hold relatively homogenous values or norms through selection, promotion, and socialization processes. Under meritocratic bureaucracy, an isomorphic force causes bureaucrats to have less diverse political ideologies compared to the general public outside the bureaucracy. In this sense, a centripetal force is at play within the bureaucracy, making an ideologically centrist government.

Ideological extremists are less likely to start careers as bureaucrats, as agency managers are unlikely to select ideologically extreme job candidates. And individuals with extreme ideological beliefs—either extremely liberal or extremely conservative—are unlikely to seek government work at all, given that distrust of government is common to both extreme conservatives and extreme liberals. In addition, even after the selection procedure that deters ideological outliers from entering the bureaucracy, the socialization and promotion processes can be at play in making an ideologically unified government. Once in their government jobs, bureaucrats who adhere to the norms of their agencies and/or professions will develop reputations that will make them valuable to retain and good candidates for promotion. For bureaucrats whose ideologies align comfortably with their professions’ priorities, such adherence will be easier than it is for bureaucrats who are ideological outliers. Ambitious bureaucrats who are ideologically at home will find career advancement in their agencies and/or professions appealing. Ambitious but ideologically misfit bureaucrats may find themselves unhappy on the job and stymied in their efforts to advance, and so may exit government employment entirely. Ideological extremists who do take government agency jobs are, therefore, less likely to maintain government employment and less likely to advance than their more moderate colleagues. In short, we posit that the ideological variation among government employees is smaller than among the general public and that government employees are less likely to be ideological extremists than members of the general public. We also argue that the ideological variations become even smaller as individuals advance their careers within the bureaucracy.

We test these claims using state administrator survey data from the American state administrators project. Our preliminary analysis suggests that, in the United States, ideological diversity is greater among the general public than among government employees, and ideological extremists are significantly more common in the general public than among government employees. Within the senior state agency ranks, ideological extremism declines as the length of government service increases. The preliminary results are consistent with an ideological centripetal force in the American bureaucracy. We also plan to test the ideological variations at different levels of the governments - whether ideological variations is smaller among administrators in federal governments than those in the local governments.

Public administrators may not be “neutral,” but the bureaucracy – federal and local governments – could be at least ideologically moderate, representing the society's majority. Our theory thus carries enormous implications for the health of pluralist democracy in a diverse state. The bureaucracy can serve as an institution with a centripetal force in an era of extreme political polarization. As the nation witnessed dramatically in the transition from President Trump to President Biden, the bureaucracy has been a political unifier at a moment of oft-violent fragmentation.

Authors

• Manny P. Teodoro, University of Wisconsin

• Seung-Ho An, University of Arizona

• Maxwell Allamong, Duke University