Bureaucracy, Signaling, and International Crises

• In Event: Pioneering Research on Leaders and Elites in Foreign Policy

Abstract

Credible signaling is essential in coercive interactions between states. Existing literature tends to focus on systemic features of the crisis, domestic politics, and leader traits. Yet, existing scholarship pays surprisingly little attention to the bureaucratic actors who are typically charged with formulating and delivering those signals. Theoretically, we explore how bureaucracy can undermine the credibility of signals during international crises, focusing on how organizational inefficiencies can cause states to send some types of signals (e.g., a military mobilization) but not others (e.g., a clear diplomatic demand). Empirically, we use novel hand-coding of the International Crisis Behavior dataset to test whether uncoordinated signaling shapes coercive compliance and the risk of escalation during international crises. Our findings have implications for theories of credible signaling, bureaucratic politics, and foreign policy decision-making.

Authors

• Tyler C. Jost, Brown University

• Donald Casler, University of Illinois