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Why do alliances emerge between some rebel groups but not others? Scholars argue that alliances can yield important tactical benefits to member groups. Yet not all rebel groups engage in partnerships during their time of operation in civil wars. Much of the existing quantitative work focuses on factors such as threat perception, power distribution, ideological similarities, and external sponsorship to explain this variation, but limited attention is given to the factors internal to a rebel group. This article explores the role of intra-organizational characteristics of rebel groups in understanding the patterns of inter-rebel alliances. Building on the bargaining framework, I argue that rebel leadership turnovers and the degree of leadership centralization can play a crucial role in determining when groups ally. Through logistic regressions, I test each of these hypotheses using new cross-national data on the onset of rebel alliances in all multiparty civil wars from 1989 to 2016. The main findings should speak directly to the emerging literature on inter-organizational networks among violent non-state groups and how they influence the processes of conflict and peace. Furthermore, this project has important policy implications related to the timing and effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies in multiparty civil conflicts.