All-Affected Principle and the Point of Democracy Revisited

• In Event: Politics of Shared Agency beyond State Borders

Abstract

Whereas democratic theory has been widely debated for decades, the question about the boundary of democracy has only gained academic attention more recently. Instead of merely looking at what justifies democracy, the boundary problem also considers who the ‘demo’ consists of. One important theory in the boundary problem is the all-affected principle. In the original form, the all-affected principle states that everyone who is affected by a decision should have a democratic say in the decision (see Goodin). However, the all-affected principle has been criticized as over inclusive: if we understand affectedness leniently, everyone is, in a (perhaps very distant) sense, affected by almost all decisions (see Miller, Stilz).
In this paper, I defend a restrictive version of the all-affected principle. My version of the all-affected principle is restrictive in three ways: it only applies to (i) laws or policies (cf. specific decisions) enacted by (ii) non-voluntary authority that (iii) sufficiently affect the autonomy interests of individuals. By non-voluntary authority, I refer to an authority that is not subject to a higher democratic or voluntary authority, or authority that cannot be truly voluntary even when subject to a higher democratic or voluntary authority. This criterion distinguishes my account from recent accounts which expand the scope of all-affected principle to firms or philanthropy organizations (see Gould, Christiano, Hayward, Saunders-Hastings and Reich, Rubenstein). Practically, this criterion restricts the application of the principle to the state and certain international organizations. As will be explained below, the principle should be restricted to non-voluntary authority because the point of the principle is to respect the second-order autonomy of individuals, which entail the autonomy to (sometimes) surrender one’s decision-making power to an authority that one consents voluntarily to. This also forms one of the innovations of my all-affected principle.
An answer to who should have a democratic say depends on what the point of democracy is. I shall argue that the point of democracy is to make laws and policies – some of which are bound to affect the first-order autonomy of individuals – consistent with the second-order autonomy of individuals. My argument starts with the importance of autonomy, that being one’s own master is of intrinsic values. It then proceeds with a potential conflict between being autonomous and being subject to authority. Here, a distinction between voluntary authority and non-voluntary authority becomes relevant: one’s autonomy may entail voluntarily subjecting oneself to authority. Therefore, the dilemma between authority and autonomy is most vivid with respect to non-voluntary authority. I further argue that involuntary authority can be made consistent with individual autonomy if one is part of the collective committed to enact laws and policies together in a manner that respect each participant’s second-order autonomy. This means that all those whose autonomous interests are sufficiently affected should have a democratic say in laws and policies enacted by an involuntary authority. While the first step of my argument may appear similar to Wilson’s (in the sense that we both adopt an autonomy-based account of democracy), the latter steps distinguish my account from his, forming the original contribution of my theory.
After setting out my theory, I consider three important objections to my all-affected principle. The first objection appeals to the collective self-determination: it contends that the all-affected principle undermines the collective self-determination of a political community because it allows those who are not part of the political community to have a say in the policies enacted by the political community (Stilz). The second objection appeals to value of shared political identity (Miller). The third objection argues that the all-affected principle is infeasible (Miller). I shall provide a response to these objections.
My argument contributes to existing literature in the following ways. First, by restricting my all-affected principle in the three ways outlined above, my all-affected principle is better equipped to address the over-inclusiveness concern. Second, I provide a moral justification for the all-affected principle based on what is fundamental to democracy. Third, I defend the all-affected principle against important objections.

Author

• Elaine Yim, Princeton University