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Autocratization of IO membership is increasingly endangering democratic majorities in international organizations (IOs). While this has led to an extensive debate about the future of the liberal international order, we still know relatively little about consequences that both episodes of democratic backsliding and autocratic consolidation might have for IOs. In this paper, we theorize international preferences of different sub-regime types vis-à-vis IOs. We argue that due to different domestic constraints, international preferences vary not only between autocracies and democracies. Instead, backsliding away from liberal democracy towards electoral democracy and electoral autocracy creates uncertainties that are consequential for how member states position themselves within IOs. We test our argument by exploring how the behavior of democratic backsliders within IOs compares to that of established democracies and autocracies. With this specific focus on shifts between sub-regime types, we add to a more fine-grained understanding of the role of domestic conditions in change of global governance by moving beyond a dichotomous understanding of regime type and regime change.