In-Group Anger or Out-Group Ambivalence? How Voters Perceive Transfers in India

• In Event: Dominant Parties and Voters

Abstract

Welfare programs in developing democracies increasingly use objective rules to identify beneficiaries, and directly transfer benefits to intended recipients, cutting out party intermediaries. Such programs can end up significantly benefiting voters outside the ruling party’s ethnic core. Does this invite a backlash from core supporters, and rewards from out-groups? Evidence from survey experiments in India shows that core supporters of the ruling party do not punish it for substantially benefiting out-groups. Focusing on out-groups, we analyze a natural experiment to show that an expensive direct transfer ($2,000 house) fails to weaken ethnic preferences, even when beneficiaries recognize that the ruling party has done something for them, and are aware that objective rules determine eligibility for the benefit. Strikingly, it is the ambivalence of out-groups, not a backlash from core supporters, that constrains politicians from adopting reforms that reduce discretion, favoritism, and leakages.

Author

• Shikhar Singh, Duke University