The Effect of Incumbency on Local Political Dynasties and Elite Capture

• In Event: Politics of Development in MENA

Abstract

Whether or not power begets power and leads to formation of political dynastic families at the local level is an important question: Local dynastic families are a prevalent form of elite capture, and they might stall the benefits of decentralization. In a regression discontinuity framework, we study the formation of local political dynasties using data from a closed-list election setting, Turkey. We find that incumbency increases a mayor's likelihood to put candidates from their own families on party lists in the subsequent election. We also explore the conditions in which local dynasty formation is more likely. We find that localities in which the general educational attainment level and turnout are lower are more prone to the formation of local political dynasties. Additional analysis that employs an original candidate and household survey provides a supply-side explanation as well: in places with generally lower educational attainment, it is easier for winners to stuff party lists with candidates from their own families as there are fewer aspirants who want to become candidates.

Authors

• Tugba Bozcaga, King's College London

• Rabia Kutlu Karasu, Stanford University

• Aytuğ Şaşmaz, Bryn Mawr College