Lobbying the Bureaucracy versus Lobbying the Legislature

• In Event: Lobbying, Lobbyists, and Regulations

Abstract

When and why do interest groups choose to lobby the bureaucracy? Existing research on lobbying has focused primarily on legislative lobbying. Yet, bureaucratic lobbying has received relatively little attention. In response, I focus on the conditions under which interest groups decide to engage in bureaucratic lobbying as opposed to When and why do interest groups choose to lobby the bureaucracy? Existing research on lobbying has focused primarily on legislative lobbying. Yet, bureaucratic lobbying has received relatively little attention. In response, I focus on the conditions under which interest groups decide to engage in bureaucratic lobbying as opposed to legislative lobbying. Using city-level data collected from 2003 to 2016, I show that the chance of joint lobbying (both bureaucratic and legislative) is high when the issue of interest is both region-specific and has a clear beneficiary. Further, I find evidence that the likelihood of a city's participation in bureaucratic lobbying correlates with its corresponding MC's legislative power. The chance of bureaucratic lobbying is high when a city's corresponding MC has low legislative power, suggesting a potential complementary mechanism in lobbying. These findings further our understanding of interest group politics and intergovernmental lobbying.

Author

• Fred Gui, Louisiana State University