Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Moral hazard poses one of the most serious obstacles to international cooperation, especially when dealing with common challenges like financial crises. How is moral hazard incurred and identified in the present hyper-connected world? In contrast to the "weaponized interdependence" theory, we argue that cooperation networks can distribute uneven responsibilities. By employing an original dataset encompassing all bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) signed since 2008, which represents the most rapidly expanding layer of the global financial safety net, and utilizing both a Bayesian synthetic control method and panel matching, we find that states located on the periphery of the BSA network bear less overall cooperation responsibility, leading to moral hazard. Furthermore, in cooperative efforts aimed at preventing public bad, our research indicates that cooperation networks can distribute uneven responsibilities and constraints, while network power may fail to curb moral hazard. Central states taking on greater cooperation responsibilities also resolves the puzzle of why states can sign bilateral agreements without international organizations' monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.