Democratizing Exclusion

• In Event: Potential from the Scorned: Ambiguity, Dependence, Exclusion, and Victimhood

Abstract

Democratic theorists usually applaud inclusion and treat all forms of political exclusion as anti-democratic. However, such a simplistic view downplays the dangers of harmful participation. Political participation of democratic citizens can and does sometimes harm the democratic polity. For example, when participants insult or silence others in the deliberative process, when disinformation disseminators distort voters’ judgments, and when candidates sponsored by foreign agencies pursue agendas that sabotage democratic systems, indifferent inclusion leaves democracies vulnerable to such detrimental participation, which often rejects the shared norms and values of liberal democracy and cripples democratic institutions. On the other hand, exclusion can indeed be misused to eliminate opponents and to stymie a robust and plural public space. Recognizing both the need and danger of exclusion, this article seeks to respond to one of the fundamental challenges to liberal political thought—how can democracy defend itself from harm and danger while remaining open and inclusive to diverging thoughts, ideologies, and participants with varying beliefs and values?

Building off Suzanne Dovi’s In Praise of Exclusion (2009), I counter the general view that exclusion is always anti-democratic. Drawing from the republican idea of freedom as non-domination and self-mastering (e.g. Pettit 2012), I argue that exclusion (either excluding democratic participants from certain platforms, benefits, or the entitlement of certain rights) can indeed be democratized and employed as a legitimate device to safeguard democracy. I differentiate two kinds of institutional exclusions: exclusion as a qualification device or as a power-limiting mechanism, and contend that qualification can only be justified when one intentionally menaces the democratic polity or violate the basic rights of others, while power-limiting can be employed when one unintentionally contributes to systemic causes that erode democracy. Revisiting Hannah Arendt’s account of democracy as common worldmaking, I maintain that exclusion is only considered legitimate and democratic when used to ensure that each participant is treated as an equal, self-rule common world-maker of the democratic world.

Author

• Yi-Hsuan Huang, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill