Appetite for Revision: Drones, Cheap Power, and Militarized Interstate Disputes

• In Event: Bargaining and Disputes

Abstract

Bargaining models of war argue that the value of spoils sought is closely connected to the costs of conflict. If a state increases its ability to inflict or deflect costs, its "appetite" for spoils will increase. Since the Second World War, airpower has been a key determinant of battlefield success and, consequently, the ability to secure conflict-related objectives--spoils--at reasonable cost. Armed drones provide a cheap and effective alternative to air power. This gives states with access to drones the ability to use or threaten to use effective military power. Because drones increase military capability, access makes it more likely that states will both attempt to settle old disputes and initiate new ones—an appetite for revision. Recent examples include conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (2020). The benefit of drones has a cost: uncertainty about when development becomes capability increases the risk of preemptive dispute settlement by an opponent. This theory of source and target behavior in response to the development and acquisition of drones is tested using a new country-year dataset (2000-2016). Statistical results support the proposed theory: drone access makes states more likely to settle old scores and initiate new disputes, while development makes states more likely to be the target of a militarized dispute by an opponent.

Author

• Jacob Aronson, University of Maryland, College Park