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In recent years, researchers and policy practitioners have paid substantial attention to the rise of populism, as exemplified by Donald Trump’s election and Brexit. A long line of studies in comparative politics and international relations have focused on explaining the sources and patterns of populism, specifically focusing on rising support for far-right, populist parties. Most of these studies, however, look into populism as the political and electoral consequences of cultural backlashes (Inglehart and Norris 2016) or adverse economic shocks triggered by globalization, especially trade competition with low-income countries (Rodrik 2021). Consequently, we do not know much about how the rise of populism across countries has affected the liberal economic order, although populism is often equated with anti-globalization sentiments. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining the varying effects of populism on trade policy and trade outcomes in 50 countries over 2000-2018. Relying on a variety of recent data on party platforms (Volkens et al. 2021; Lindberg et al. 2022), the paper examines the degree to which populist parties vary in their stance over trade protection and international economic cooperation. Then the paper examines whether and to what extent levels of populism in governments are linked to changes in trade performance and policy outcomes across countries. The paper considers the implications of the nexus between populism and trade at the global and regional levels.