Grand Strategy & Alliance: US Reaction to the 1970s South Korean Missile Program

• In Event: Signaling and Risk

Abstract

What explains the changes in the United States’ response to the 1970s South Korean Missile Development? This work argues that changes in the grand strategy of the United States in the 1970s offer a complementary explanation to the variation in the US Responses toward South Korea’s Missile Development program. Even though many studies have addressed the history of South Korea’s attempt to develop its missile program in the 1970s, since most of the studies have focused on the decision-making process of the South Korean government regarding the missile development and the US responses to it only in the context of the nuclear program, they paid less attention to the changes in Washington’s responses to the Seoul’s missile program – not the nuclear program – and what makes the variation.
Assuming that the concept of grand strategy is a useful analytical tool despite some conceptual vagueness, this study claims that a change of grand strategy in terms of prioritization between policies inevitably brings about alliance alignment, which causes a structural transformation of an alliance. Specifically, it is insisted that the changes in the US grand strategy in the early 1970s resulted in policy adjustment mainly in three areas – security policy, regional priority, and priority between norms – contributing to Washington allowing Seoul’s missile program to be limitedly continued in the late 1970s, which is different from the US's earlier stance. By conducting the archival analysis of the US government from 1970 to 1979 to see the influence of grand strategy in alliance politics, this work not only hopes to shed additional light on the variation in the US foreign policies but gives academic implications to elaborate grand strategy as a theoretical framework.

Author

• Dabin Lim, Seoul National University