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Dynamics in East Asian regionalism have dramatically shifted as a result of the rising tensions in the East and South China Seas over multiple maritime and territorial disputes, China’s growing influence throughout East Asia, and the strategic re-balancing of the United States. This paper aims to examine China’s changing discourse and practice in the ASEAN-centered multilateral maritime security while it insists on resolving its maritime and territorial disputes on the bilateral basis. This research builds on the existing literature of ASEAN-centered regionalism and delves deeper into Beijing’s discourse and policy towards the recent mechanisms of maritime security (e.g., ASEAN Maritime Forum and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, among others). Through the prism of systemism, this paper seeks to answer these questions: To what extent has China shifted its support for regional multilateralism as an approach to maritime security and why? What China and the other stakeholders of regional maritime security can do to maintain and strengthen multilateral cooperation as a viable path for maritime security? The systemist approach, which emphasizes graphic portrayal of cause and effect, is well-suited to the task of comparing and evaluating theoretical arguments and empirical trends regarding regional maritime security.
Through an analytical framework that compares China’s rhetoric and behavior concerning East Asian regionalism before and after 2009, this paper argues that China’s significant growth in its economic and military power has emboldened its maritime claims at the expense of what it had carefully cultivated through the multilateral regional institutions. The paper further offers policy recommendations for Beijing to re-prioritize these seemingly incompatible foreign policy goals.