Decoupling Rural Identity from the American White Working Class

• In Event: Mini-Conference on Politics in Post-industrial Societies III: Place, Identity, and Grievances amidst Economic Crises

Abstract

Narratives of recent US presidential elections often highlight the role of rural white working-class voters supporting Donald Trump and right-wing populism. This narrative echoes the popular and academic explanation that certain groups within society have experienced economic relative deprivation, thus fueling group-based resentment that drove populist support for Trump in 2016 (Pettigrew 2017; Sides et al. 2017). Accordingly, the groups more likely to have felt this relative economic decline are often the white working class or rural residents, whose blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and more have taken a particular hit in recent decades (Scala and Johnson 2015, but see Rothwell and Diego-Roswell 2016). Further, previous scholarship on the role of rural social identity in predicting candidate support – especially for anti-establishment Republicans – points to the importance of working-class membership in this equation (Cramer 2016; Cramer Walsh 2012).

However, there may be reason to believe that there is either no relationship between class and rural identity when predicting right-wing anti-establishment support among whites especially, or, that rural identity is linked to political attitudes for the middle to upper classes. First, rural identity is strongly tied to a lack of status, respect, and dignity (Cramer Walsh 2012; Lunz Trujillo and Crowley 2020), which is in line with expectations from Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT scholarship argues that social identification is based on symbolic concerns rather than material conflict (Tajfel et al. 1979). This has two possible implications that run counter to prevailing wisdom. The first is that class may not relate to rural identity and political outcomes in any meaningful way; economic self-evaluations have not consistently predicted political behavior in the US public for the most part (Achen and Bartels 2016). Rather, group identity and sociotropic economic concerns are more notable. Second, those who are more politically engaged in general tend to have more resources and are also more apt to link themselves and their immediate surroundings to political identities, groups, and grievances (Federico 2004; Mason 2018).

What, then, is the relationship between rural social identity and class when predicting recent Republican support, particularly among whites, at the national level? Using ANES data and original surveys, I test whether Americans high in rural identity who are low to medium in income and education level (or who identified as poor or working class) were more likely to support Donald Trump or more strongly affiliate with the political right. Notably, I find that there is consistently little to no relationship between rural identity and class variables for white voters. In addition, interactions between rural identity and class variables do not significantly predict Trump support or right-wing affiliation. Further, I find that at times rural social identity strength predicts Trump support more for white voters higher in class indicators. Finally, stronger rural identifiers are not more likely to report feeling relative economic deprivation and are sometimes less likely to do so. Nationally, the white working class is not consistently at the intersection of rural identity - particularly regarding political outcomes – thus complicating our understanding of some of the predominant narratives at the national level.

Author

• Kristin Kay Lunz Trujillo, University of South Carolina