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Figuring out which ethical norms, laws, and epistemic structures should govern our responses to online hate speech and misinformation requires, in part, an adequate psychological theory of how belief formation works. Unfortunately, we don't have any such theory, and I argue that we are unlikely to find one. I review a few of the leading social-scientific accounts of what causes people to believe the (sometimes hateful) falsehoods they encounter online, and identify these theories' shortcomings. I explain why we should be skeptical about the prospects of developing any neatly parsimonious theory of belief formation: belief formation is shaped by a messy, dynamic, holistically interrelated set of content-specific, person-specific, and context-specific factors. Nevertheless, I propose that we can make piecemeal progress toward better understanding the causes, consequences, and complexities of belief formation. And this piecemeal progress has tangible implications for how best to design online (and offline) social networks, how to legislate over them, and how, as individuals, to navigate through them.