Political Economy of War: Theories and Implications

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel brings together a group of scholars working at the intersection of political economy and war. Each paper addresses important questions in conflict studies by developing a theoretical model that has direct implications for empirical research. Ruggiero studies how the features of the international system, such as the distribution of power and economic linkages, can affect the outbreak and scale of war. Abramson and Qiu study how ideological incentives affect individuals’ decision to enlist in conflict and their performance on the battlefield. Kennard, Sonin, and Wright study whether economic considerations impact civilian support for conflict termination, showing that competition may undermine support for rebel reintegration. Sun considers how uncertainty over the future productivity of contested areas affects both government and insurgent tactics, deriving distinct rationales for each to escalate violence today.

Sub Unit

• Division 21: Conflict Processes

Individual Presentations

• What Makes a World War? Economic Linkages and the Distribution of Power - Joseph Ruggiero, Stanford University

• A Cause to Fight, Ideological Motivation in Civil Wars: British Battalion in Spain - Xiaoyan Qiu, Washington University in St. Louis; Scott Abramson, University of Rochester

• Conflict Tactics in Degraded Environments - Jessica Sun, Emory University

• The Politics of Diplomacy in Third-Party Intervention - Yu Mei, University of Rochester

Chair

• Alexandre Debs Yale University

Discussants

• Brenton Kenkel Vanderbilt University

• Michael Gibilisco California Institute of Technology