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What explains variation in the quality of elections, and how is this shaped by information technology (ICTs)? Scholars have typically focused on one causal mechanism - falling information and co-ordination costs make it easier to monitor officials, disincentivising malpractice. This paper advances an alternative account. ICT provision drives local economic development, fostering support for the ruling party. For pro-government election officials this reduces the need to behave irregularly, while it incentivises greater malpractice among their proopposition counterparts. I test this argument in Malawi, studying how 3G internet coverage affects polling booth outcomes in a contested election. Irregularities reduce in areas dominated by the government but rise in opposition strongholds.
In addition, household panel data suggests coverage has developmental effects which drive shifts in incumbent support. The paper recasts ICTs through a materialist framework of technological change, while also contributing to the literature on parties and elections in new democracies more broadly.