The Miles’ Law Effect on the U.S. Beef and Pork Imports in Legislative Yuan

• In Event: Legislative Behavior and Intraparty Dynamics in Taiwan

Abstract

Conventional wisdom indicates that ideology drives parties’ position-taking on foreign policy. However, there is increasing evidence that other factors also predict position-taking. The government tends to focus on state-to-state relations, whereas the opposition tends to appeal to the public for their supervision responsibility. However, how long will the position-taking of either the government or the opposition last? Here, I introduce a bureaucratic theory—Miles’ Law—to the legislative study, arguing that an administration official’s stance on a policy often changes as he or she is promoted to a higher position. Likewise, when the government becomes opposition, it tends to change the stance it once had on a policy, and vice versa. Miles’ Law replenishes the theory of Losers’ Consent, which believes that the framework of the parties’ position-taking is static. Miles’ Law helps predict the swap of the party stances on the issues of the United States beef and pork imports in Taiwan. I examine the legislative speeches on the imports throughout the two presidential terms, finding that the ruling party legislators preferred their party interests to the strengthened U.S.-Taiwan relations from the imports’ approval. Nevertheless, the opposition party legislators weighed food safety more than the chance to reinforce the relations through imports. Moreover, the swap of the positions exists. The findings shed light on the flexibility of a political party’s primary concern depending on its ruling or opposition position.

Author

• Joshua Teh, Tunghai University