A Secular Backlash?: Changes in Youth Religiosity in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia

• In Event: Religion, State, and Mass Attitudes

Abstract

Ten years after the 2011 Uprisings in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA), the youth (ages 15-29) in the region, according to World Values Survey, are increasingly identifying as “non-religious.” While youth describing themselves as “not religious/atheist” has increased everywhere except Iraq, the most dramatic increase in non-religious youth took place in countries where Islamic political parties won elections and led governments. Specifically, while youth identifying as non-religious increased by 21% overall, it increased by 200% in Egypt, 54.4% in Morocco, and 45.5% in Tunisia, where Islamic political parties served as post-2011 incumbents. Even more surprising, such changes in youth religiosity took place in contexts with quite different experiences of Islamic political party incumbency ranging from a steady coalition leader in Morocco to a stable opposition party in Tunisia and to a former incumbent and now banned organization in Egypt. Hence, to question this puzzling development, this study asks what explains the changing patterns of religiosity amongst the youth in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia where Islamic political parties won elections and led governments.

This is an important topic to address for several reasons. Foremost, the extant literature on religion and politics in the MENA focus either on the macro-level, questioning the role of state-religion relations and how religiosity impacts one’s political beliefs and actions, or on organizations, examining the transformations of Islamic movements/parties, and the rise of fundamentalism and radicalization. By doing so, the literature treats religiosity as an independent variable, looking at its effects on political beliefs and behavior. Instead, this study treats religiosity as a dependent variable looking at how socio-political transformations influence religiosity.

Treating religiosity as a dependent variable makes important theoretical contributions. Firstly, this study analyzes how macro-level developments affect the micro-level by examining what external factors influence one’s religiosity. This is different from extant studies that take religiosity for granted in that it examines what makes a person religious. Secondly, this study deconstructs what religiosity is in the first place by adding layers to religiosity, particularly, by differentiating between individual piety and support for political Islam and Islamic political parties. Lastly, this study has political importance. Per the UNDP’s 2016 Arab Development Report, one-third of the region’s population is between the ages of 15-29. Thus, it is important to understand this new generation’s religio-political views.

To study this puzzling development, this paper uses a comparative approach and looks at how three seemingly similar countries, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, within the same region, North Africa, and with a shared culture, history of authoritarianism, and socio-economic development, all witness a similar development, a decline in youth religiosity, albeit in different degrees. Based on this comparative work, this study argues that youth religiosity declined in those countries that saw Islamic political party incumbencies because the youth is turning away from a state-centric Islam understanding, but that such decline varies with each country’s Islamic political party experiences. Undoubtedly, there are other factors influencing changes in youth religiosity, such as global information flows, social media, and new religious movements that do not target the state. Thus, this study does not aim to explain all factors leading to changes in youth religiosity but rather aims to examine one aspect of it, namely how the use of religion by the state and Islamic political parties influences the youth’s religious engagement.

This topic is also situated within various literature on Religion and Politics. This paper, in its focus on youth’s religious disengagement under Islamic political party incumbencies, is situated within the literature on how Islamic political parties behave in party politics and who supports them. In particular, by looking into how voters view Islamic political party incumbencies and react to them, this study questions whether it really is religiosity or politics that drives support for Islamic political parties. Secondly, this paper builds on public opinion in the MENA literature, which looks at the diversity of public opinion in the region along generational lines and country-specific characteristics and the complexity of religiosity’s effect on politics. It does so by studying different layers of religiosity including personal piety and support for political Islam, as well as changes in religiosity over time and place. Lastly, this study is situated within the larger literature on growing generational gaps, wherein younger voters are liberalizing, while older voters are lashing back by holding into conservatism. Particularly, it questions whether the youth is turning away from religion or political Islam.

Author

• Esen Kirdis, Rhodes College