Delayed Reaction: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine as Revolutionary War

• In Event: The War in Ukraine

Abstract

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, scholars have searched for causal frameworks to make sense of the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Realist explanations have probably been the most prominent, with defensive realists viewing the war as a response to NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, while offensive ones argue that it represents an attempt by Russia to reassert its regional hegemony. It has also been viewed as an expression of Russian cultural imperialism, a way for Vladimir Putin to shore up his domestic support, or even the nostalgic fantasy of a former KGB operative unable to accept the collapse of his beloved Soviet Union.

In this paper, I argue there is considerable explanatory power in understanding this conflict as a revolutionary war. Such conflicts represent nearly a quarter of all interstate wars in the modern era and there are certain patterns common to them, many of which are relevant to the war in Ukraine. The attempt to exploit perceived post-revolutionary weakness, the ideological hostility of the intervening power toward the revolutionary state, and the irredentist desire to adjust borders are all recurrent features of such wars and all present in this case.

At the same time, every war is unique and the one in Ukraine has been unusual in a number of respects. Most perhaps notable has been Russia’s lack of success despite its apparent power advantage; although many past challengers have failed to achieve their objectives, they were generally weaker prior to the revolution and overestimated its effects on the revolutionary state. A second is the structure of the conflict, which began with a limited territorial grab in 2014 following the Madian Revolution, led to nearly a decade of partially frozen conflict, and culminated in a full-scale invasion of the revolutionary state, a pattern not seen in any past case.

I explore the reasons for these aberrations, singling out several factors for particular consideration. One is the unusual relationship between Ukraine and Russia, which led Putin to simultaneously seek to control his neighbor while also dismembering it, a strategy which has backfired spectacularly. Another is the international environment. Unlike in most historical cases, the Maidan Revolution angered Ukraine’s most powerful neighbor while also attracting support from other key actors, especially the United States. Finally, there is the role played by nuclear weapons, which limited the ability of third parties to intervene in the war without precluding such involvement entirely. Finally I consider what past revolutionary wars suggest about the future of this conflict as well as what it in turn portends for such wars in the future.

Author

• Paul Ewenstein, Boston University